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I. INTRODUCTION 
An arbitral tribunal’s power to decide its own jurisdiction is its 
kompetenz-kompetenz and is a “conceptual cornerstone[] of international 
arbitration as an autonomous and effective form of international dispute 
resolution.”1  The inherent requirement that parties to a valid arbitration 
agreement (AAG) must honor that agreement by arbitrating their disputes 
precludes national courts from tampering with the result of a valid arbitral 
 
 1. Robert H. Smit, Separability and Competence-Competence in International Arbitration: Ex 
Nihilo Nihil Fit? Or Can Something Indeed Come from Nothing?, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 19, 19 
(2002). 
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award.2  National courts must respect and uphold valid AAGs as enshrined 
in Article II(3) of the New York Convention:     
 The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a 
matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement 
within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the 
parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said 
agreement is null and void, inoperative[,] or incapable of being 
performed.3 
However, because the Convention does not provide a firm definition as 
to what defects qualify as “null and void, inoperative[,] or incapable of being 
performed,”4  States are free to exercise significant discretion.5  State 
discretion under the Convention extends to when and under what 
circumstances national courts will hand over jurisdictional decisions to 
tribunals.6  The result has been unreliable practices of kompetenz-kompetenz 
in different nations across the globe, calling into question whether 
kompetenz-kompetenz is truly the “inherent power”7 of arbitral tribunals.    
This paper analyzes differing views and approaches to kompetenz-
kompetenz and proposes a workable framework of kompetenz-kompetenz 
for the future.  Part II provides an overview of the general principle of 
kompetenz-kompetenz, discussing the views of some of the leading 
international commercial arbitration scholars on kompetenz-kompetenz.8  
Part III analyzes the approaches taken by the United States and the United 
Kingdom and uses them as helpful illustrations of kompetenz-kompetenz in 
practice.9  Part IV notes the shortcomings of the aforementioned approaches 
and proposes a limited form of negative kompetenz-kompetenz as the 
 
 2. Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, Negative Effect of Competence-Competence: The 
Rule of Priority in Favour of the Arbitrators, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE 257, 257 
(Emmanuel Gaillard & Domenico di Petro eds., 2008). 
 3. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
art. II(3), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 258. 
 6. Id. 
 7. NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES WITH ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, 
REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: STUDENT EDITION 347 (5th ed. 2009). 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
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solution.10  Part V concludes.11  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Basic Notion of Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
In general, kompetenz-kompetenz “recognizes the authority of arbitral 
tribunals to determine their own jurisdiction.”12  It provides arbitrators with 
the authority to determine their own jurisdiction to increase efficiency of the 
arbitral system without judicial interference.13  The level of kompetenz-
kompetenz granted to tribunals varies from country to country14 as States 
seek to balance two competing interests: preservation of legitimate claims 
against arbitral jurisdiction and reduction of judicial interference and 
delaying tactics.15   
Two essential theories allow kompetenz-kompetenz to properly 
function: (1) an arbitral tribunal is given the power to decide its own 
jurisdiction (kompetenz-kompetenz); and (2) the arbitration clause is treated 
as separate and independent from the remainder of the contract 
(separability).16  While an in-depth discussion of separability is beyond the 
scope of this paper, a brief discussion on its importance in connection with 
kompetenz-kompetenz is vital.  Separability and kompetenz-kompetenz 
work together with the common goal of preventing early judicial 
interference with arbitration.17  Separability, by treating the AAG as separate 
and distinct from the remainder of the contract, protects a tribunal’s ruling 
on jurisdiction from subsequent failures of the contract.18  However, 
 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part V. 
 12. George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International Commercial Arbitration, 37 
YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 14–15 (2012) [hereinafter Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem]. 
 13. See id. at 14. 
 14. Compare infra Part III.A (analyzing the U.S. approach to kompetenz-kompetenz), with infra 
Part III.B (analyzing the U.K. approach to kompetenz-kompetenz).  
 15. John J. Barceló III, Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and 
Competence-Competence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1115, 1119 
(2003) (recognizing that not all parties that resist arbitrations are obstructionists). 
 16. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES WITH REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 348–49. 
 17. Barceló III, supra note 15, at 1116. 
 18. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES WITH REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 348–51.  For 
example, separability permits the tribunal to hold at the merits stage of a dispute that no valid 
[Vol. 2014: 17, 2014] Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
20 
“whereas separability is universally accepted, [k]ompeten[z]-[k]ompeten[z] 
is controversial and has spawned a range of different national responses.”19 
All jurisdictional decisions made by a tribunal under its kompetenz-
kompetenz are subject to judicial review, and courts have the final word on 
jurisdiction.20  A tribunal’s kompetenz-kompetenz power varies from 
country to country and sometimes differs within jurisdictions of the same 
country.21  These transnational inconsistencies have significant 
repercussions.  Without having the power to determine its own jurisdiction, 
an arbitral tribunal would have to halt proceedings each time a party 
challenged its jurisdiction and refer the issue to national courts, greatly 
diminishing the efficiency of arbitration.22  Inconsistent views of kompetenz-
kompetenz also undermine the enforcement of arbital awards as the courts of 
the country of enforcement may perform their own jurisdictional review—
applying the appropriate law of the AAG—and separately conclude that 
kompetenz-kompetenz was not properly conducted, refusing enforcement of 
the award.23 
B. Positive v. Negative Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
Kompetenz-kompetenz has a positive dimension (granting arbitrators 
the power to determine their own jurisdiction) and a negative dimension 
(prohibiting courts from interfering with arbitrators’ kompetenz-kompetenz 
power at the outset of the arbitral process).24  Challenges to arbitral 
jurisdiction can occur at one of three stages in the arbitration process: (1) at 
the initiation of the arbitral process; (2) during the arbitral process; or (3) 
 
contract exists without destroying its initial ruling that the AAG portion of the contract granted 
proper jurisdiction.  Id.  
 19. Barceló III, supra note 15, at 1123. 
 20. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES WITH REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 351.  It is not 
possible for kompetenz-kompetenz to “completely divest national courts of all authority to consider 
challenges to arbitral jurisdiction because it is the courts (and the state’s enforcement resources), 
ultimately, which must enforce any arbitration agreements and awards. . . .”  Smit, supra note 1, at 
25.  
 21. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES WITH REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 351. 
 22. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem, supra note 12, at 14.  This has led some authors to argue 
that kompetenz-kompetenz should extend beyond granting tribunals the power to decide their own 
jurisdiction to actually prohibit courts from hearing jurisdictional challenges until after the issuance 
of a final award.  See infra notes 31–37 and accompanying text. 
 23. See, e.g., Part III.B.1 (discussing this very scenario that occurred in Dallah). 
 24. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem, supra note 12, at 16. 
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after the final award.25  While the timing of jurisdictional challenges is 
largely within the discretion of the parties, the kompetenz-kompetenz rules 
of the law applicable to the AAG inform the timing of challenges.26  The 
relevant law’s stance on positive and negative kompetenz-kompetenz is 
informative of the jurisdictional challenge options open to parties. 
The primary issue in determining the appropriate extent of kompetenz-
kompetenz is the timing of judicial interference and the extent of review of a 
tribunal’s jurisdiction ruling.27  Positive kompetenz-kompetenz refers to 
arbitrators’ power to determine their own jurisdiction and is recognized in a 
majority of countries.28  In contrast, courts do not universally acknowledge 
negative kompetenz-kompetenz because it requires courts to forfeit their 
judicial authority to hear a dispute regarding arbitral jurisdiction until after 
the issuance of a final award.29  Similarly, commentators have asserted 
varied approaches as to the proper approach to kompetenz-kompetenz and 
the role of negative kompetenz-kompetenz in international arbitration.30  
Under negative kompetenz-kompetenz, courts restrict their review of 
jurisdiction at the initial stages of the arbitral process to a prima facie review 
of the AGG to determine if the agreement is “null and void, inoperative[,] or 
incapable of being performed.”31  Beyond that, national courts cannot 
interfere with a tribunal’s ruling on jurisdiction until after a final award has 
been issued.32  This makes arbitrators the first—although not sole—judges of 
jurisdiction33 and respects the autonomous nature of international 
commercial arbitration.34  
 
 25. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES WITH REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 351. 
 26. Id. at 351–53. 
 27. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 258; see also Alan S. Rau, Everything You Really 
Need to Know about “Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 
93–94 (2003) (categorizing kompetenz-kompetenz as a timing issue). 
 28. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 259 (Positive kompetenz-kompetenz “empowers 
an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction without any illogicality arising from the fact that it 
is not a permanent body. . . .”). 
 29. See id. at 259–60. 
 30. See infra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.   
 31. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 259; see New York Convention, supra note 3 and 
accompanying text. 
 32. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 259. 
 33. Id. at 259–60.  “Adopting a prima facie standard of review, on the other hand, is nothing 
more than accepting a temporary deference to the arbitrators, as opposed to a prima facie suspicion 
[of] the arbitrators. . . .”  Id. at 268. 
 34. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 269. 
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Proponents of negative kompetenz-kompetenz assert two primary 
arguments in its favor: (1) recourse to courts during arbitral proceedings 
permits judicial interference into what should be an autonomous process; 
and (2) recourse to courts before the issuance of a final award encourages 
delaying tactics.35  Gaillard and Banifatemi contend that positive kompetenz-
kompetenz fundamentally requires the recognition of negative kompetenz-
kompetenz to ensure that courts “refrain from engaging into the examination 
of the arbitrators’ jurisdiction before the arbitrators themselves have had an 
opportunity to do so.”36  According to this theory, negative kompetenz-
kompetenz has the added benefit of promoting judicial efficiency by 
condensing courts’ role in reviewing arbitrations to a single proceeding of 
challenges to the final award as well as jurisdiction.37 
In contrast, Bermann concludes that postponing review of jurisdiction 
until after the issuance of a final award poses significant efficiency issues, 
and he rejects Gaillard and Banifatemi’s promotion of a strict construction of 
negative kompetenz-kompetenz.38  Rather, Bermann treats kompetenz-
kompetenz as a gateway issue, asserting that kompetenz-kompetenz “need 
not preclude a court from entertaining a challenge to arbitral jurisdiction 
prior to constitution of the arbitral tribunal.”39  Bermann’s approach limits 
negative kompetenz-kompetenz by not stripping courts of their power to 
hear jurisdictional challenges until the constitution of a tribunal: he would 
 
 35. BLACKABY & PARTASIDES WITH REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 352.  Gaillard and 
Banifatemi argue that protecting arbitration from intentional delaying tactics goes to the very heart 
of international commercial arbitration by protecting arbitration’s efficiency.  See Gaillard & 
Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 260.  Additionally, Gaillard and Banifatemi contend that negative 
kompetenz-kompetenz ensures that parties’ time and resources will not be wasted through 
unnecessary concurrent jurisdiction with courts.  Id.  
 36. Id. at 258.  Restricting concurrent jurisdiction ensures that parties’ time and resources are not 
unnecessarily wasted.  Id. at 260.  However, Bermann asserts that negative kompetenz-kompetenz 
creates its own type of inefficiency: permitting the entire arbitral process to proceed, with the 
associated costs and time, only to have a court hold there was no jurisdictional after the issuance of 
the final award.  Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem, supra note 12, at 19; see, e.g., Part III.B. 
 37. See Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 260–61.  However, while negative kompetenz-
kompetenz may increase judicial efficiency, it may decrease overall efficiency.  See discussion supra 
note 36. 
 38. See Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem, supra note 12, at 19; see also George A. Bermann, 
The U.K. Supreme Court Speaks to International Arbitration: Learning from the Dallah Case, 22 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 18–19 (2011) [hereinafter Bermann, The U.K. Supreme Court Speaks].  
 39. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem, supra note 12, at 15.  Bermann contends that the 
pertinent issue in determining the correct approach to kompetenz-kompetenz is whether an arbitral 
tribunal has already been established to begin exercising its kompetenz-kompetenz.  Id. 
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permit judicial recourse before the constitution of a tribunal but restrict it 
afterwards.40 
III. VARYING APPROACHES: THE CURRENT STATE OF LAW IN THE U.S. AND 
U.K. 
A. The U.S. Approach 
1. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan: A Presumption Against 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
First Options, a brokerage firm that clears trades on the Philadelphia 
Stock Exchange, cleared the trading account of MK Investments (MKI), a 
wholly-owned investment company of Manuel and Carol Kaplan.41  The 
Kaplans and First Options signed a “workout” agreement consisting of four 
documents that governed the resolution of the debts that MKI and the 
Kaplans owed First Options as a result of the stock market crash of October 
1987.42  After MKI incurred significant additional loses, First Options 
liquidated its assets and demanded that the Kaplans personally pay any of 
MKI’s deficiency.43  First Options sought arbitration after MKI and the 
Kaplans failed to pay the debt.44   
Only one of the four documents contained in the workout agreement 
contained an arbitration clause.45  MKI, having signed that document, 
submitted to arbitration.46  The Kaplans, however, had not personally signed 
the document containing the AAG and insisted that the arbitration panel did 
 
 40. Id. at 14–21.  Bermann favors the German approach to kompetenz-kompetenz, which permits 
courts to hear jurisdictional challenges to arbitration prior to a tribunal’s constitution.  Id. at 19–21.  
However, after the constitution of a tribunal, German courts will take concurrent jurisdiction over 
jurisdictional challenges but do not permit the stay of arbitration.  Id. at 21.  This removes the 
potential for parties to use judicial recourse as a delaying tactic for arbitration.  Id.  Although, it does 
not resolve resource drain of concurrent jurisdiction that Gaillard and Banifatemi were concerned 
with.  See discussion supra note 36. 
 41. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 940 (1995). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 941. 
 46. Id. 
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not have jurisdiction over their claims.47  The panel, exercising its 
kompetenz-kompetenz, ruled that it had jurisdiction over the Kaplans and 
issued a final award in favor of First Options.48  The Kaplans appealed to the 
Federal District Court requesting that the award be vacated for lack of 
jurisdiction.49  The district court confirmed the award, the Third Circuit 
reversed, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, finding no arbitral 
jurisdiction.50   
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to define the bounds of 
kompetenz-kompetenz in American jurisprudence.51  The Court took a 
heavily contractual view of kompetenz-kompetenz and instructed that 
tribunals do not have the power to decide arbitral jurisdiction unless the 
parties have provided for kompetenz-kompetenz by “‘clea[r] and 
unmistakabl[e]’” language.52  Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a 
dispute turns on whether the parties contractually agreed to arbitrate that 
dispute, the issue of who determines the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal 
turns on what the parties contractually agreed on that matter.53  The Court 
further opined that such a high showing of intent was proper because parties 
were relinquishing the “practical value” of their right to judicial recourse, 
displaying the preference of U.S. courts for resolution through courts rather 
than arbitration.54  
Under the “clear and unmistakable” standard, American courts begin 
their jurisdictional analysis with the presumption that tribunals do not have 
kompetenz-kompetenz to determine jurisdiction.55  This presumption takes 
 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 941, 949. 
 51. Id. at 942.  
 52. Id. at 944 (alterations in original) (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commuc’ns Workers of Am., 
475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).  The Court’s analysis turned largely on its view that “arbitration is 
simply a matter of contract.”  First Options, 514 U.S. at 943. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 942.  The Court further displayed its preference for adjudication over arbitration when 
it stated that a lower threshold requirement than clear and unmistakable evidence “might too often 
force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have thought a judge, not an 
arbitrator, would decide.”  Id. at 945. 
 55. Id. at 944.  The Court employs a higher threshold requirement for parties to provide a 
tribunal with kompetenz-kompetenz: whereas the arbitrability of a merits issue is given the 
presumption of assent by the Court when the agreement is silent as to the particular issue, the Court 
reverses the presumption on the jurisdictional issue.  Id. at 944–45.  The Court’s rationale was that it 
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root in the Court’s contractual view of kompetenz-kompetenz.56  The Court 
held that when contracts are silent as to the arbitrability of jurisdiction, the 
parties’ most likely intent was not to submit the issue to arbitration.57  
Furthermore, any review of jurisdictional rulings made by tribunals to which 
kompetenz-kompetenz was not clearly and unmistakably given must be 
analyzed by courts without deference to the tribunal’s findings.58  In this 
way, the Court’s precedent calls into question fundamental concepts of 
positive kompetenz-kompetenz without even contemplating negative 
kompetenz-kompetenz.59  
2. Repercussions of the U.S. Approach 
The repercussions of the U.S. approach to kompetenz-kompetenz are 
rooted largely in the U.S.’s lack of statutory authority guiding kompetenz-
kompetenz60 and the U.S.’s failure to distinguish between domestic and 
international arbitration.  Although the FAA is a pro-arbitration instrument, 
the Court’s pro-adjudication approach to kompetenz-kompetenz reflects 
American courts’ suspicion of international arbitration.61  Years after the 
 
is less likely that a party will realize that it is forfeiting its jurisdictional right when it signs an 
arbitration agreement.  Id. at 945. 
 56. See id. at 943–47; see also discussion infra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.  
 57. Id. at 945.  However, the Court’s contractually-based rationale does not hold true for 
international arbitration.  See infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 58. Id. at 946–47. 
 59. Compare id. at 943–44 (declining to give tribunals power to determine their own jurisdiction 
unless parties provide for such power in clear and unmistakable terms), with supra Part II.B.  
 60. The FAA does not include a provision defining the U.S. approach to kompetenz-kompetenz.  
See Smit, supra 1, at 27; Adriana Dulic, Note, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan and the 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz Principle, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 77, 91–92 (2002).  Rather, kompetenz-
kompetenz is purely defined by the courts.  In contrast, most other States have more fully developed 
arbitration statutes that specifically address kompetenz-kompetenz.  See, e.g., Arbitration Act  1996, 
c.23, § 30 (Eng., Wales, N. Ir.).   
 61. The Second Circuit stated:  
Our deference to arbitrators has gone beyond the bounds of common sense.  I cannot 
understand the process of reasoning by which any court can leave to the unfettered 
discretion of an arbitrator the determination of whether there is any duty to arbitrate.  I 
am even more mystified that a court could permit such unrestrained power to be 
exercised by the very person who will profit by deciding that an obligation to arbitrate 
survives, thus ensuring his own business.  It is too much to expect even the most fair-
minded arbitrator to be impartial when it comes to determining the extent of his own 
profit.  We do not let judges make decisions which fix the extent of their fees. . . . How, 
then, can we shut our eyes to the obvious self-interest of an arbitrator? 
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First Options decision, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
kompetenz-kompetenz principle, describing arbitral power as circular.62  The 
Seventh Circuit held firm to the “[n]o contract, no power” view taken by the 
Supreme Court in First Options and wondered “how else would 
jurisdictional disputes be resolved?” then by the judiciary.63 
The U.S.’s failure to distinguish between domestic and international 
arbitration begins with the legislature’s failure to embody the distinction in 
statutes and continues with the judiciary’s failure to separate the two when 
setting precedent.64  The negative effects of merging the two forms of 
arbitration is seen clearly through the kompetenz-kompetenz standard 
created in First Options: while the harsh contractual presumption that parties 
have not contemplated arbitral jurisdiction may properly gauge party intent 
domestically,65 the same presumption is not as readily applicable to the 
international arbitration context.66  Arbitration is the primary, not secondary, 
form of resolving international commercial disputes.67  So, when parties—
who are often times sophisticated businesses—assent to an arbitration 
agreement, their typical intent is to avoid the mess of international litigation.  
Unfortunately, the Court failed to contemplate the repercussions of its 
decision on international arbitration and created a broad-based presumption 
against positive kompetenz-kompetenz for domestic as well as international 
arbitrations.68 
 
Ottley v. Sheepshead Nursing Home, 688 F.2d 883, 898 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard, J., dissenting) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 62. Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., First Options, supra Part III.A (domestic case that will now apply to international 
arbitrations under U.S. law). 
 65. First Options dealt with a domestic arbitration.  See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying 
text. 
 66. Robert H. Smit, Separability and Competence-Competence in International Arbitration: Ex 
Nihilo Nihil Fit? Or Can Something Indeed Come from Nothing?, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 19, 29–
30 (“[E]ven if the First Options presumption that parties intend to litigate rather than arbitrate issues 
of arbitrability were appropriate in the domestic context, it would be inappropriate to import that 
presumption into the international arena.”). 
 67. Id. at 30. 
 68. See First Options, supra note 41. 
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B. The U.K. Approach 
1. Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. Pakistan 
The dispute in Dallah concerned a 1996 contract between Dallah Real 
Estate and Tourism Holding Company and the Awami Hajj Trust—a trust 
created by the Government of Pakistan.69  The contract between Dallah and 
the Trust provided Dallah’s construction of housing for pilgrims visiting 
holy sites in Saudi Arabia.70  In 1995, the Government of Pakistan agreed to 
Dallah’s terms in a Memorandum of Understanding.71  The terms of the 
contract were finalized in 1996, and Dallah and the Trust—not the Pakistani 
Government—signed the contract, which included a valid AAG directing 
any dispute to International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) arbitration.72  
Subsequently, the regime in Pakistan fell from power and was replaced.73  
The new governmental authorities pursued no further actions in regards to 
the contract with Dallah, and the Trust ceased to exist as a legal entity as of 
December 11, 1996.74  
Dallah initiated ICC arbitration against the Government on May 19, 
1998 in France.75  The Government at all points during the arbitration and 
subsequent litigation denied being party to any AAG.76  The ICC arbitral 
tribunal, exercising its kompetenz-kompetenz, ruled that it had proper 
jurisdiction over the claims brought against the Government in a partial 
award dated June 26, 2001.77  The tribunal subsequently found the 
Government liable for Dallah’s damages, and after over eight years of 
arbitration, it issued a final award against the Government for $20,588,040 
USD.78  Dallah sought enforcement of the award in England.79  The High 
Court refused to recognize the award because the tribunal lacked jurisdiction 
 
 69. Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46,  [2] (appeal taken 
from Eng.), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/UKSC_2009_0165_Judgmentv2.pdf. 
 70. Id. at [3]. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at [7]. 
 73. Id. at [8]. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at [9]. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at [1], [9]. 
 79. Id. at [10]. 
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over the Government, and the Court of Appeals dismissed Dallah’s appeal.80   
The U.K. Supreme Court—applying French law as the law of situs81—
determined that the Government was not a signatory of the arbitration 
agreement.82  It then denied enforcement of the arbitration award for lack of 
jurisdiction because the Government was not a party to the AAG and did not 
qualify as an unnamed third party.83  The U.K. Supreme Court interpreted 
the French case law as applying an arbitration agreement to an unnamed 
third party only: 
[P]rovided that it is established that their contractual situation, their 
activities and the normal commercial relations existing between the 
parties allow it to be presumed that they have accepted the 
arbitration clause of which they knew the existence and scope, even 
though they were not signatories of the contract containing it.84 
The Court rejected Dallah’s argument that a reviewing court other than a 
court of the seat of arbitration should review a tribunal’s jurisdictional 
findings under kompetenz-kompetenz facially and flexibly, granting 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at [17]. 
 82. Id. at [34]–[35]. 
 83. Id at [69].  While the U.K. Supreme Court identified the correct legal standard to apply under 
French law, see infra note 84 and accompanying text, the U.K. Supreme Court did not properly 
apply that per the subsequent ruling of the French Court d’Appel.  Cour de’appel [CA] [regional 
court of appeal] Paris, Feb. 17, 2001, No. 09/28533, Gouvernement du Pakistan Ministere des 
Affaires Religieuses v. Societe Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co.  After successfully 
fending off enforcement of the award in England, the Government of Pakistan challenged the award 
itself in French courts.  Id.  The French Court of Appeal applied the same French law standard as the 
U.K. Supreme Court but concluded that the Government of Pakistan had intended to be bound by the 
arbitration agreement.  Id.  Therefore, while the Government successfully avoided enforcement in 
England, Dallah’s award is still valid to seek enforcement in any other New York Convention 
signatory.  See Jacopo Crivellaro, Conflicting Contrasts in Dallah v. Government of Pakistan, 17 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 51 (2011), http://www.cjel.net/online/17_2-crivellaro/.  
 84. See Dallah, supra note 69 at [18] (quoting in translation Cour de’appel [CA] [regional court 
of appeal] 1e civ., 1992, Bull. Civ. I, No. 95 (Fr.) Orri v. Societe des Lubrifiants Elf Aquitaine, 
Revue de l’Arbitrage 95 (Fr.)).  The applicable French law required the application of customary 
practices of international law to determine if the tribunal properly exercised jurisdiction.  Dallah, 
supra note 69 at [18].  The U.K. Supreme Court noted that it was “difficult to conceive that any 
more relaxed test would be consistent with justice and reasonable commercial expectations” but still 
found that the Government did not qualify as a third party to the arbitration agreement.  Id.; supra 
note 83 and accompanying text. 
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evidentiary deference to the tribunal’s choice.85  Instead, the Court 
performed its own, independent review of jurisdiction with no deference to 
the tribunal’s conclusion on jurisdiction.86  
Taking a contractual view of arbitration, the Court’s analysis of 
kompetenz-kompetenz relied heavily on what the relevant parties assented to 
in the contract.87  The Court recognized the need for arbitrators to determine 
the extent of their authority over a dispute but declined to give the 
kompetenz-kompetenz to do so without having the power conferred upon 
them by each party.88  In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in First Options that “clear and unmistakable 
evidence” must be given to show specific agreement.89  Based on this 
significant limitation of arbitral jurisdiction, the U.K. Supreme Court 
concluded that no deference is given to a tribunal’s kompetenz-kompetenz 
when an issue arises as to the validity of the exercise of that power.90   
2.  The Effect of Dallah  
Dallah set firm precedent that English courts will give no deference to 
 
 85. Id.  Dallah contended that a reviewing court outside the country of the seat of arbitration 
should refuse to become involved in the jurisdictional matter when the tribunal’s conclusions were 
facially plausible or “reasonably supportable.”  Id.  In rejecting this point of view, the Court 
concluded that Dallah’s position that the courts of the seat of arbitration held a special power to 
review jurisdiction undermines fundamental concepts of international commercial arbitration.  Id. at 
15 (referring to Dallah’s argument as “iron[ic]”).  The benefit of international arbitration—
transnational enforcement under the NY Convention—requires a transnational view of review and 
enforcement that cannot be tied to a singular country.  See id. 
 86. See id. at [21]–[29].  Specifically, the Court expressed concern that kompetenz-kompetenz 
was too often viewed as permitting arbitrators to be the sole judges of jurisdiction when “the real 
purpose of the [kompetenz-kompetenz] rule is in no way to leave the question of the arbitrators’ 
jurisdiction in the hands of the arbitrators alone.”  Id. at [22] (internal citations and quotations 
omitted).  The Court rejected this view as neither logical nor acceptable and determined that 
jurisdiction must be fully reviewed by the court in which enforcement is sought.  Id. at [23].  In 
performing this analysis, the Court found that the Government had proven that there was no common 
intention for it to be bound by the arbitration agreement.  Id. at [39]. 
 87. See id. at [24]–[26]. 
 88. Id. at [24] (“Arbitrators (like many other decision-making bodies) may from time to time find 
themselves faced with challenges to their role or powers, and have in that event to consider the 
existence and extent of their authority to decide particular issues involving particular persons.  But, 
absent specific authority to do this, they cannot by their own decision on such matters create or 
extend the authority conferred upon them.”). 
 89. Id. at 13; see also First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943–44 (1995). 
 90. Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46, [30].   
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arbitral jurisdictional rulings, and it represents the inefficiency of the 
negative kompetenz-kompetenz model.91  The U.K. Supreme Court’s 
holding that jurisdictional rulings are not to be given any deference in 
reviewing their validity has already begun to affect lower courts’ application 
of kompetenz-kompetenz.92  In the aftermath of Dallah, English courts will 
not presume that the defendant of a jurisdictional challenge is in a favorable 
position because an arbitral tribunal ruled in its favor.93  This lack of 
deference to the decisions of abritrators as to jurisdiction undermines the 
basic premise of kompetenz-kompetenz by giving arbitral findings under 
that authority no subsequent legal effect.  The result is a lack of security in 
the exercise of kompetenz-kompetenz, which threatens to impact the U.K.’s 
reputation as a pro-enforcement jurisdiction.94     
Dallah also illustrates the inefficiency of negative kompetenz-
kompetenz, which is the model used by French courts (the law of the AAG 
in Dallah).95  In Dallah, the entire arbitral process had been completed from 
a partial award on jurisdiction, to a partial award on liability, to a final award 
with damages before the jurisdictional issue was ever heard by a court of 
law.96  Indeed, it was not until the enforcement stage that judicial recourse 
concerning jurisdiction—which the Government had challenged from the 
beginning—was ever heard97 because French law’s negative kompetenz-
kompetenz prohibited judicial recourse anytime before a final award.98  The 
result is a lesson in the inefficiency of such an approach: a long and 
expensive arbitration may be completed but never enforced due to the 
 
 91. See Bermann, The U.K. Supreme Court Speaks, supra note 38, at 19–20. 
 92. See, e.g., A v. B [2010] EWHC 3302 (Eng., Wales).  In A v. B, the English commercial court 
applied the Court’s ruling in Dallah to a domestic arbitration.  Id. at [25] A lost an award in an 
arbitration proceeding and brought a jurisdictional challenge—a section 67 challenge—to the court.  
Id. at [1].  B responded with an application to the court to secure his arbitral award—a section 70(7) 
application—but his request for security of the award was dismissed.  Id. at [2].  The commercial 
court, interpreting Dallah, held that challenges to arbitral jurisdiction now require a “complete 
rehearing and not a review.”  Id. at [23]. 
 93. Gary Born, The Impact of Dallah, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Feb 10, 2011), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/02/10/the-impact-of-dallah/. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Bermann, The U.K. Supreme Court Speaks, supra note 38, at 19–20. 
 96. Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. Pakistan, [2010] UKSC 46, [9].   
 97. Id. 
 98. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem, supra note 12, at 15–19 (describing the French negative 
kompetenz-kompetenz approach). 
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threshold issue of jurisdiction.99  
IV. THE SOLUTION: A REVISED APPROACH TO NEGATIVE KOMPETENZ-
KOMPETENZ 
The U.S. and U.K. approaches display the pitfalls of taking an overly 
conservative or overly liberal construction of kompetenz-kompetenz.100  In 
First Options, the U.S. Supreme Court limited positive kompetenz-
kompetenz by creating a presumption that arbitrators do not have the power 
to determine their own jurisdiction unless clear and unmistakable language 
in the AAG bestows it upon them.101  Yet, positive kompetenz-kompetenz is 
vital to the efficiency of international commercial arbitration where judicial 
recourse is often an inefficient and complicated method of dispute 
resolution.102  Furthermore, parties to an international commercial AAG 
typically intend to bestow positive kompetenz-kompetenz on a future 
tribunal when they sign an AAG.103  As a result, the U.S.’s overly restrictive 
approach threatens the core efficiency of international commercial 
arbitration by setting a baseline presumption that parties intend to resolve 
their disputes in courts.104  
In contrast, Dallah displays the inefficiencies that can result from 
extending kompetenz-kompetenz beyond its positive dimension to actually 
restrict the power of courts (negative kompetenz-kompetenz).  While Dallah 
was ultimately left with a valid award,105 Bermann’s concerns that negative 
kompetenz-kompetenz creates the possibility that an entire arbitral process 
will occur only to be overturned on a gateway issue were almost realized by 
Dallah.106  Had the French court not upheld the award,107 Dallah would have 
 
 99. Bermann, The U.K. Supreme Court Speaks, supra note 38, at 19.  Although in the present 
case, the resources were not completely wasted because the French court upheld the award and 
enforcement could be sought in an alternative jurisdiction.  See discussion supra note 83. 
 100. See infra notes 101–08 and accompanying text.  
 101. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). 
 102. See supra notes 24, 28 and accompanying text.  
 103. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.  
 104. Id.  However, this presumption could always be overcome with the inclusion of clear and 
unmistakable language giving the jurisdictional issue to the tribunal.  See supra note 55 and 
accompanying text. 
 105. See discussion supra note 83.   
 106. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 107. See discussion supra note 83. 
[Vol. 2014: 17, 2014] Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
32 
proceeded through over eight years of arbitration—with the compiling 
costs—only to find out that the tribunal’s jurisdiction was never valid.  
Essentially, negative kompetenz-kompetenz prevents courts from resolving 
such massive threshold issues until a final award is issued, which may be a 
decade or more later.108   
A workable solution to kompetenz-kompetenz must balance the U.S.’s 
respect for valid challenges to jurisdiction—by providing judicial recourse—
with negative kompetenz-kompetenz’s reverence for the autonomy of 
international commercial arbitration.109  The U.S. approach is too restrictive 
of a tribunal’s power to determine jurisdiction,110 and the U.K. approach is 
alternatively too expansive.111  First, kompetenz-kompetenz in international 
commercial arbitration must provide tribunals with the presumption of 
positive kompetenz-kompetenz.112  Second, tribunal autonomy and 
efficiency must be protected from delaying tactics through a limited form of 
negative kompetenz-kompetenz that provides for full review—not simply a 
prima facie determination—of a tribunal’s jurisdiction before a final award 
is issued.113   
Kompetenz-kompetenz in international commercial arbitration must 
include a presumption that positive kompetenz-kompetenz exists.114  The 
rationale behind the U.S.’s opposite presumption does not hold up in the 
international context where parties are specifically seeking to avoid judicial 
recourse by opting into the primary method of international commercial 
dispute resolution: international commercial arbitration.115  Positive 
kompetenz-kompetenz not only reflects the likely intent of international 
commercial actors, but it protects the arbitration process from unnecessary 
interference, increasing efficiency.116  Furthermore, positive kompetenz-
kompetenz puts the jurisdictional question in the hands of more qualified 
 
 108. See supra Part III.B.2.  Although a court under Gaillard and Banifatemi’s view must wait 
until the “end of the arbitral process”, a prima facie review of jurisdiction can be made at the outset.  
Gaillard & Banifatemi, supra note 2, at 259–60.  However, a prima facie review does not preclude 
the possibility of a subsequent full review discovering that no jurisdiction exists.  See id. 
 109. See infra notes 117–23 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.  
 111. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text. 
 112. See infra notes 114–17 and accompanying text. 
 113. See infra notes 118–21 and accompanying text. 
 114. See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra Part II.B. 
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decision makers—arbitrators—that are familiar with the procedures of 
international commercial arbitration, conflicts of law, and application of 
laws from varying countries.117  
In order to prevent improper delaying tactics at the outset of arbitration, 
kompetenz-kompetenz must also have a negative dimension; however, 
negative kompetenz-kompetenz should be less expansive than Galliard and 
Banifatemi’s assertion that challenges must wait until a final award has been 
issued.118  A more balanced approach would prohibit recourse to courts only 
during the jurisdictional phase of arbitration.119  Once a partial award as to 
jurisdiction is rendered, a party seeking to challenge jurisdiction should have 
full recourse to courts.  Admittedly, judicial recourse can be a long process 
that can drive up costs through concurrent jurisdiction and can act as a 
delaying tactic to halt arbitration through a stay.120  To remedy these defects, 
the court hearing the jurisdictional challenge should determine as an initial 
matter whether a stay of the arbitral proceedings during the litigation of the 
jurisdictional issue is proper, or whether the litigation and arbitrations should 
proceed concurrently.121  A motion for stay of arbitration would trigger a 
prima facie review of the AAG by the court at the outset of the litigation to 
allow courts to discern the initial validity of the challenge.  If it appears as if 
the challenge holds little merit and may be a delaying tactic, then the sitting 
court on its prima facie review should permit arbitration to proceed with 
concurrent jurisdiction (similar to the German approach122).  However, if the 
court’s prima facie review concludes that a valid jurisdictional issue is 
present, the court should stay the arbitration until the court rules fully on the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction.  In this way, the court can balance the two conflicting 
interests of judicial challenges for jurisdiction by hearing valid challenges to 
jurisdiction but not permitting meritless delaying tactics to slow the arbitral 
process.  
A presumption of positive kompetenz-kompetenz balanced with a 
 
 117. See, e.g. discussion supra note 83 (describing how the U.K. Supreme Court incorrectly 
applied French law, whereas the arbitrators’ decision that the jurisdiction was proper under French 
law was upheld by the French Cour d’Appel). 
 118. See supra notes 31–40 and accompanying text.  
 119. See infra notes 120–23 and accompanying text. 
 120. See discussion supra note 35. 
 121. In this way, my view differs from the German model that creates concurrent jurisdiction 
between courts and an ongoing tribunal.  See discussion supra note 40. 
 122. See discussion supra note 40. 
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restricted form of negative kompetenz-kompetenz allows arbitrations to be 
the initial jurisdiction decision makers without precluding valid challenges 
to jurisdiction until the issuance of a final award.123  While a singular 
solution to two competing dispute resolution systems will always have its 
shortcomings, this revised version of kompetenz-kompetenz respects the role 
of both systems and permits recourse for parties with genuine challenges to a 
tribunal’s jurisdiction.  
V. CONCLUSION 
States, given the discretion to define the bounds of kompetenz-
kompetenz, have created varying forms of kompetenz-kompetenz.124  The 
United States presumes this “inherent power” of arbitrators does not exist.125  
In contrast, France not only presumes tribunals have the jurisdiction to 
decide jurisdiction, but courts are prevented from engaging in jurisdictional 
challenges until a final award is issued.126  An unfortunate result of this was 
almost displayed in the U.K.’s refusal to enforce the Dallah award after 
finding there was never arbitral jurisdiction over the completed eight-year 
arbitration.127  In responding to the shortcomings of the above approaches, 
this paper proposes that courts take a middle ground: presume positive 
kompetenz-kompetenz and institute a limited form of negative kompetenz-
kompetenz.  By merging the two approaches, kompetenz-kompetenz can 
work to promote the greatest amount of arbitral efficiency and autonomy. 
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